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Abstract: 
We use panel data from nine countries over the period 1996 to 2003 to test how revenue diversi-
fication in conjunction with increasing bank size affects bank value. Using a comprehensive 
framework for bank performance measurement, we find no evidence for a conglomerate dis-
count, unlike studies concerned with industrial firms. Rather, revenue diversification increases 
bank profitability and is associated with higher market valuation. This performance effect does 
not depend on whether diversification was achieved through organic growth or through M&A 
activity. 
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1. Introduction 
While many non-financial firms around the world have been striving for corporate busi-
ness focus over the last two decades, many financial services firms and especially banks 
have been heading in the opposite direction and have instead increased revenue diversi-
fication. This paper analyzes empirically whether or not the trend towards diversifica-
tion in global banking has been in the interests of bank shareholders and it aims to shed 
light on the channels through which diversification might affect value creation in bank-
ing. 
The trend among many non-financial firms towards more business focus signifies that 
the costs associated with diversification generally exceed diversification benefits and 
consequently, that diversification hurts performance. Excessive costs might arise from 
inefficient investment decisions over internal capital markets and from increased busi-
ness complexity and bureaucracy. 
Section 3.1 of this paper documents that average diversification levels of the world’s 
largest banks were almost one third higher in 2003 than they had been in 1996. Com-
mercial banks typically increased diversification by moving into fee-based businesses. 
Banks with already strong fee-based revenues expanded into trading activities. Yet other 
banks diversified revenues by underwriting insurance contracts. 
The disparate diversification trends between non-financial firms and banks raises the 
question of whether many banking institutions are prone to make the same mistakes that 
many non-financial firms made during the conglomeration wave of the sixties and nine-
ties of the last century or whether the banking business is truly special in the sense that a 
broadening of business scope creates value for bank shareholders. Such value creation 
could come from two broad sources. One is bank-specific economies of scope. Unlike 
most firms from other industries, banks often entertain long-term contractual relation-
ships with their customers. Over time banks can gather extensive customer information 
and reuse that information not only in the business area where the information was 
originally gathered but also in other non-related business areas. Moreover, banks that 
operate with high operational leverage (i.e., a high ratio of fixed costs to variable costs) 
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might find that diversification into related businesses awards them with a cost advantage 
over specialized competitors. For example, selling life insurance through the existing 
retail bank branch network might result in cost economies of scope. If such economies 
of scope truly exist in banking, diversification will tend to have positive effects on ag-
gregate welfare and financial system stability. 
The second reason why business diversification might be in the interest of bank share-
holders has to do with the current state of the entire financial services industry. Mainly 
due to technological progress and deregulation, the financial services industry has been 
undergoing dramatic change over the last two decades. It is still far from clear how pre-
cisely the industry will develop in the near future and as a consequence which specific 
business areas will offer the highest value creation potential. In a recent paper, Boot 
2003 argues that banks have extended their business scope mainly as a strategic re-
sponse to this business uncertainty. Banks have been investing into diverse business ar-
eas early on to acquire the skills needed to make efficient production decisions and to 
reap profits when a particular business area eventually turns out to flourish. Given the 
real option character of skill building investments, wealth implications for shareholders 
of diversifying financial institutions are a function of the degree of strategic uncertainty, 
the effectiveness of early skill building or skill reusing, and ultimately the ability of an 
institution to create shareholder value from the opportunities at hand. It should be clear 
that this strategy cannot turn out to be successful for all the banks that have embarked 
on it. Rather one would expect that some institutions will indeed develop into broad 
powerhouses while others will have to absorb the losses from a failed market entry. If 
the observed trend towards more diversification was largely driven by such a foot-in-
the-door strategy, aggregate effects on welfare and stability are ambiguous at best and 
bank shareholders as well as regulators should watch diversification trends very care-
fully. 
This paper attempts to provide a fresh view on the direct and indirect effects of revenue 
diversification on equity market value by disentangling the aggregate diversification ef-
fect typically measured by other studies. To that end we measure the effects of diversi-
fication on financial indicators from three tiers of a comprehensive framework for bank 
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valuation. We also account for potential interactions between diversification, size and 
vertical integration by explicitly controlling for simultaneous changes along these two 
other dimensions of banking firm boundaries. 
Our main finding is that revenue diversification enhances bank profitability via higher 
margins from non-interest businesses and lower cost income ratios. We conjecture that 
revenue and cost economies of scope are non-trivial in financial services and that value 
creation is not restricted to a few banks that succeeded with their foot-in-the-door strat-
egy. We estimate that the increase in diversification between 1996 and 2003 has in-
creased the average market-to-book ratio of the banks in our sample by more than one 
tenth and therefore provide evidence for a conglomerate premium in banking. 
The paper unfolds as follows. The next section provides a quick review of the relevant 
empirical literature. Section 3 presents the multi-tier framework for measuring diversifi-
cation effects. Our data set is presented in section 4. In section 5 we present and discuss 
our empirical results Section 6 gives further evidence and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
There is a large body of literature on the costs and benefits of diversification. Among 
the identified benefits are economies of scope (e.g., Chandler 1977; Teece 1982), an 
improved resource allocation through internal capital markets (e.g., Williamson 1975; 
Stein 1997), a potentially lower tax burden due to higher financial leverage (e.g., 
Lewellen 1971) and the ability to use firm-specific resources to extend a competitive 
advantage from one market to another (e.g., Wernerfelt & Montgomery 1988 and 
Bodnar et al. 1997). These benefits have to be traded off against the costs associated 
with diversification. Cost may stem from agency problems afflicting diversifying in-
vestments (e.g., Jensen 1986; Meyer et al. 1992), inefficient internal resource allocation 
due to a malfunctioning of internal capital markets (e.g., Lamont 1997; Scharfstein 
1998; Rajan et al. 2000), informational asymmetries between head office and divisional 
managers (e.g., Harris et al. 1992), and increased incentives for rent-seeking behavior 
by managers (e.g., Scharfenstein & Stein 2000). 
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There is abundant empirical evidence for US industrial firms that the cost of diversifica-
tion outweighs its benefits from a shareholder’s perspective. The by now classic studies 
by Lang & Stulz 1994 and Berger & Ofek 1995 report that diversified US firms trade at 
an 8% and 13% to 15% equity discount, respectively, as compared to their specialized 
peers. However, more recent work has cast some doubt on the general existence of a di-
versification discount. It has been argued that measurement problems (e.g., Whited 
2001), data problems (e.g., Harris 1998; Villalonga 2004), selection biases in terms of 
firms, observation period or country (Graham et al. 2002; Lins & Servaes 1999) and 
failure to account for the endogeneity of the diversification decision (Campa & Kedia 
2002) have driven the results of earlier studies. While the academic debate has not 
reached a final consensus, a common broad picture emerges according to which value 
creating diversification is rather the exception than the rule in most industries. 
The empirical literature on the merits of bank diversification has largely focused on the 
question of whether the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act allowed US commercial banks 
to reduce business risk by diversifying into non-traditional financial services. The po-
tential to reduce earnings volatility was found for combinations of earnings streams 
from banking and insurance activities (Boyd et al. 1993; Laderman 1999; Lown et al. 
2000) but was hardly found at all for the combination of earnings streams from interest-
based banking activities and fee-based securities activities (Allen & Jagtiani 2000; 
Estrella 2001).  
Stiroh & Rumble 2003 measure the effect of diversification on the risk-adjusted profit-
ability of US financial holding companies for the period 1997–2002. They find that 
revenue diversification towards fee income reduced risk-adjusted returns because over 
their observation period, fee-based activities were more volatile but not necessarily 
more profitable than traditional interest earning activities. The lack of evidence for posi-
tive diversification effects on profitability is echoed by event studies on diversifying 
bank mergers (e.g., DeLong 2001) and by the abundant empirical literature that applies 
frontier efficiency analysis to examine the productive efficiency of banks. In their ex-
tensive survey article Berger & Humphrey 1997 report that there is a lack of strong evi-
dence in favor of or against the joint provision of different financial services. 
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Laeven & Levine 2005 apply a modification of Lang & Stulz 1994 ‘chop shop’ method 
to measuring diversification effects on bank market valuation. They compare the mar-
ket-to-book ratio of a diversified financial institution with that of a corresponding port-
folio of selected banks specializing in either interest-based or fee-based business. They 
assume a linear relationship between diversification and market value and find that di-
versification reduces market-to-book by up to ten percentage points. 
In summary, existing empirical evidence suggests that banking does not seem to be an 
exception to the broad rule applicable to other industries, namely that diversification 
costs typically outweigh diversification benefits.  
Our paper provides a fresh view on diversification effects in banking by introducing an 
innovative measurement approach. We adopt a comprehensive framework (see next sec-
tion) that permits us to measure diversification effects both on accounting-based finan-
cial indicators and on market valuations. Moreover we allow for a non-linear relation-
ship between diversification and performance and control for bank characteristics such 
as the degree of vertical integration and the growth pattern. 
 
3. Methodology 
To investigate diversification effects on both a bank’s market valuation and its financial 
performance one needs a consistent bank valuation framework that ties market values to 
observable financial indicators. This section presents the simple framework that under-
lies our empirical analysis.  
The fundamental value (FV) of a bank’s equity equals the present value (PV) of future 
cash flows to shareholders (CF). Under clean surplus accounting the present value of 
cash flows is equal to the book value of invested shareholders’ capital (IC) plus the pre-
sent value of future economic value creation, as measured by residual income (RI). 
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Residual income in period t is defined as excess net operating profits after tax (NOPAT) 
over a capital charge for the capital invested by shareholders. The capital charge equals 
invested capital (IC) times the cost of equity (CoE). 
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where NOPAT/IC corresponds to the after tax return on equity (ROE) 
The fundamental value of a bank’s equity can therefore be expressed as a function of 
today’s nominal value of invested capital, the expected growth path of invested capital 
and the expected development of spread. Given that investors use information on past 
and current growth and past and current spread to forecast future performance, funda-
mental values will be a function of a vector of past growth and spread and a vector of 
parameters that investors believe to be indicative of the future development of economic 
value creation.  
(5)  ),...,,,...,,( 11 tttttt XSpreadSpreadICICfFV −−=
If we assume that market value is a (stochastic) function of fundamental value and if we 
further assume that book value (BV) is a good proxy for invested capital, we can ex-
press the ratio of market value to book value (MTB) as a function of the arguments of f 
(.) and substitute IC with BV. 
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Equation (6) implies that there are two channels through which diversification could af-
fect the relative market valuation of banks. Firstly, if economies of scope exist in bank-
ing, then current spreads should be ceteris paribus higher for diversified banks than for 
specialized banks, and diseconomies of scope should in turn result in lower spreads and 
lower relative market valuations. The second channel is closely related to the foot-in-
the-door strategy mentioned in the introduction of this paper. If investors expect diversi-
fication to generate real options that allow banks to quickly grasp and exploit business 
opportunities as they occur, then diversification should have a positive impact on future 
growth paths and future developments of spreads. If investors expect diversification to 
increase future business complexity and bureaucracy, then current diversification should 
bear negatively on future value creation. In both cases the vector X should contain a 
measure for diversification. Multiple countervailing effects might of course also give 
rise to a non-linear relationship between diversification and MTB and possibly to an op-
timal degree of diversification. Our estimation model for market-to-book (MTB) in 
equation (7) below therefore also contains a quadratic term for diversification (DIV). 
(7) 
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X contains further possible determinants of future performance, such as the degree of 
vertical integration. 
Note that coefficients x1 and x2 measure the effect of current diversification on investor 
expectations regarding future growth and spread. If they are found to be statistically in-
significant, this could cast doubt on the foot-in-the-door channel of diversification. In-
significant coefficients on diversification in our MTB-model, however, do not rule out 
the economies-of-scope channel of diversification because such diversification effects 
will be fully captured by the variables spread and growth.  
In order to investigate the economies-of-scope channel we estimate diversification ef-
fects on spread and on its components. Spread equals pretax operating ROE times one 
 
The Anatomy of Bank Diversification 8 
minus the corporate tax rate minus the cost of equity. Equation (8) decomposes pre-tax 
operating ROE into four performance indicators: 
(8) t
eting Incometax Opera
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 , 
where A denotes total assets, TNOR denotes total net operating revenues, TOE denotes 
total operating expenses and LLP denotes loan loss provisions. 
The ratio total net operating revenues over assets can be further decomposed into four 
asset margins: net interest revenues over assets, net fee revenues over assets, net trading 
revenues over assets and net other operating revenues over assets. Figure 2 provides a 
graphical representation of equation (8). 
We estimate eight models that have either leverage (assets over book equity), one of the 
four asset margins, expenses over assets, loan loss provisions over assets or the cost of 
equity as the dependent variable.  
(9)  tititititi XDIVzDIVzaY ,,
2
,2,1, ' εϕ +⋅+⋅+⋅+=
X contains common control variables for vertical integration, growth, size, systematic 
risk, business focus and interaction terms. We take the panel nature of our data into ac-
count by using fixed-effects regressions, and control for any time variation or macro-
factors by including a set of year dummy variables. 
A ninth model has spread as the dependent variable. This model is by definition under-
specified because it does not contain the components of spread according to equation 
(8). If we introduced these components into the estimation model for spread, error terms 
would be zero by definition. Introducing only subsets of components would be arbitrary. 
The coefficients z1 and z2 will indicate whether there exists a relationship between di-
versification and the individual components of spread. Comparisons across spread com-
ponent models will allow us to scrutinize how exactly diversification affects perform-
ance. An aggregation of diversification effects across spread-component models accord-
ing to equation (8) will allow us to check for consistency of our estimates. The aggre-
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gate effects should be broadly in line with the total effects from regressing SPREAD di-
rectly on diversification. 
 
4. Data  
We obtained accounting and stock price data from the Bankscope Database. The data-
base covers 2,072 bank holding companies from the USA, Canada, Australia, UK, 
Germany, France, Spain, Italy, and Switzerland. To exclude very small banks we re-
quired that the total assets of sample banks exceeded 1bn USD in at least one of the nine 
years of our observation period. The remaining 1,378 banks from Bankscope were 
matched with DataStream to obtain banks with available share price information. The 
final sample contains 380 listed banks with a total of 1,917 observations for the years 
1996 to 2003. The number of sample banks was not stable over the years due to mergers 
and acquisitions. While we kept acquiring banks in the sample, we excluded acquired 
banks. 65% of the sample banks are from the US, 3% are from Canada, 29% are from 
Europe and 3% from Australia. 
The CAPM beta of the banks was estimated based on matched DataStream data series. 
M&A growth numbers were calculated based on matched M&A transaction data from 
the Thomson Financial M&A Database (see section 4.2 for more details).  
4.1. Definition of Diversification 
Unlike other studies on non-financial industries we cannot measure bank diversification 
based on SIC codes and segmental accounting data. SIC-code classification for banks is 
not granular enough and is not consistent across countries. Moreover, segmental report-
ing is not consistent across banks and across time. 
Instead, we use an adjusted Herfindahl-Hirschman index to measure revenue diversifi-
cation. Various authors have applied a closely related approach (see, e.g., Comment & 
Jarrell 1995; Desai & Jain 1999; Acharya et al. 2002; Stiroh & Rumble 2003; Stiroh 
2004). Equation (10) below shows how our diversification index is constructed. 
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INT denotes gross interest revenue, COM denotes net commission revenue, TRAD de-
notes net trading revenue, OTI denotes all other net revenue and TOR denotes total 
revenue. TOR is equal to the sum of the absolute values of INT, COM, TRAD and 
OTI.5  
We use gross interest revenue so that our diversification measure is not distorted by the 
profitability of the bank’s interest business. Unfortunately, Bankscope does not consis-
tently report gross numbers for the other revenue categories.  
Note that, because we are using gross interest revenue and the absolute values for the 
other three revenue streams, total operating revenue (TOR) in equation (10) is different 
from total net operating revenue (TNOR) in equation (8). We subtract the sum of 
squared revenue shares from unity so that DIV increases in the degree of revenue diver-
sification. By definition DIV can take on values between 0 (the bank is fully specialized 
on one revenue source) and 0.75 (the bank generates a fully balanced revenue mix from 
all four revenue sources). 
Figure 1 depicts average revenue shares and average diversification levels across all 
sample banks. Diversification increased from below 30% in 1996 to over 38% in 2003. 
Average diversification levels of US banks increased from 29.8% to 38.3% with the 
highest increase in the years after the abolishment of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 (see 
Table 3). Figure 1 also indicates that the overall increase in diversification is not merely 
caused by a general decline in the revenue share of interest income. Rather, average 
revenues shares have remained fairly constant since 1998. 
                                                 
5 Negative net revenue values would lead to negative shares for some revenue streams and shares greater than one for 
other revenue streams. As a consequence, DIV would be strongly affected by business unit performance and 
could take on values far greater than 0.75.  
 
The Anatomy of Bank Diversification 11 
4.2. Definition of Other Variables 
The level of revenue diversification refers to the horizontal boundaries of a banking 
firm. Management decisions to alter horizontal boundaries are often intertwined with 
decisions regarding the level of vertical integration (vertical boundaries) and the overall 
size and growth of the institution. For example, if business complexity is a positive 
function of both the level of horizontal diversification and the level of vertical integra-
tion and if business complexity bears negatively on performance, then bank manage-
ment has to trade off horizontal diversification against vertical integration and possibly 
also against size.  
To account for possible interaction effects between the three dimensions of the bounda-
ries of banking firms we need to introduce control variables for size, growth, and verti-
cal integration into our regression analysis. 
Following standard definitions we measure size by the natural logarithm of year-end to-
tal balance sheet assets. Growth is defined based on the annual percentage change in 
equity book values. We matched Bankscope data with M&A transaction data from the 
Thomson Financial M&A Database SDC to break down total book equity growth into 
an M&A growth component and a residual organic growth component. Because Thom-
son Financial only reports transactions at market prices we first had to estimate book 
values for the acquired equity stakes. For that purpose we divided equity market values 
by the average market-to-book ratio of all banks from the same country as the target in 
the year of the transaction. We then added book values of all acquisitions and divesti-
tures undertaken by the same bank in a given year and divided that sum by the start-of-
year equity book value of that bank to arrive at an estimate of its M&A growth in that 
year. We identified 892 deals that contributed on average 3.8% to a bank’s book equity 
growth per annum. Organic growth is defined as total growth rate minus M&A growth 
rate and amounts to 14.4% per annum for the average bank in our sample. 
The measurement of vertical integration is based on the following idea. We consider a 
bank as highly vertically integrated if most of its output is generated through the em-
ployment of a bank’s own resources. A bank is considered to have a low degree of ver-
tical integration if it relies largely on outside resources and services to generate output. 
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In accordance with Tucker & Wilder 1977 (whose approach was adapted to financial 
services firms by Gellrich & Holzhäuser 2005) we use gross revenues6 as a proxy for 
output volume and we use the term in equation (11) below to capture the value-add con-
tribution of own resources. 
(11)  titititititi NOPATITLLPIExpLExpVA ,,,,,, ++++=
LExp denotes labor expenses, IExp denotes fixed charges and interest expenses, LLP 
denotes loan loss provisions, IT denotes income taxes and NOPAT denotes net operat-
ing income after tax. 
Our metric for the degree of vertical integration (VI) of a bank is defined as follows:  
(12) 
)(
)(
,,,
,,,
,
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ITNOPATVA
VI +−
+−=  
Following Tucker & Wilder 1977 we subtract pretax operating income from both the 
numerator and the denominator to adjust the metric for profitability effects. Gellrich & 
Holzhäuser 2005 provide evidence that VI as defined above captures changes in the de-
gree of vertical integration fairly accurately. In their panel regression analysis, VI is af-
fected by the extent of a bank’s outsourcing activities. For our sample banks the average 
vertical integration declined from 79.4% in 1996 to 73.9% in 2003.  
The definitions of the remaining variables follow standard definitions and are reported 
in Table 1. Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the 380 banks in the sample. Data 
series were windsorized at 0.5% and 95.5% quantiles.  
 
                                                 
6 As mentioned above, Bankscope reports gross figures for interest revenues but only net figures for the other revenue 
types. Therefore we had to approximate gross revenues from fee-based businesses, trading, and other business 
based on their corresponding net revenue figures. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Market-to-Book Model 
We start by estimating the model for the market-to-book ratio in equation (7) above. 
The vector of control variables includes the level of vertical integration, organic growth 
and M&A growth, size, the ratio of non-interest income over gross interest income and 
year dummies. The results for a fixed-effects model with year dummies (not shown) are 
presented in Table 4. 
The coefficients on both the linear and the quadratic term for revenue diversification are 
statistically insignificant. This indicates that the degree of revenue diversification plays 
no systematic role for market participants in forecasting future value creation. We view 
this result as evidence against the existence of a “foot-in-the-door-strategy” channel for 
diversification. If banks diversify their activities into new fields primarily to ensure that 
they are amongst the first to exploit further business opportunities that might arise in 
theses fields, we expect the market to have an opinion on this strategic move. However, 
the market seems to be indifferent with regard to this strategy or does not believe that 
this strategy is the true reason why many banks have diversified. 
Current shareholder value creation as measured by SPREAD has a highly significant 
and strongly positive effect on a bank’s relative market valuation. Apparently, investors 
rely to a considerable extent on current value creation when forecasting future value 
creation. Current organic or M&A growth does not systematically affect bank valua-
tions. 
As discussed above, these results do not rule out the existence of an economies-of-scope 
channel of diversification. If diversification enhances only current spread but does not 
affect future growth and spread patterns, relative market valuation will still be a positive 
function of diversification. 
5.2. Spread and Spread-Component Models 
We start by directly analyzing the relationship between spread and diversification. Note 
that – as discussed above – a model that uses SPREAD as the dependent variable is by 
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definition not correctly specified. Therefore, one should treat the regression results in 
column (1) of Table 5 as only indicative. Both coefficients on diversification are posi-
tive and significantly different from zero, indicating that spread might indeed be a posi-
tive (and non-linear) function of diversification. 
The spread-component models in Table 5 confirm that diversification strongly affects 
current value creation and permit a more detailed analysis of how diversification bears 
on bank profitability.7
DIV enters all models through both a linear and a quadratic term. Results regarding the 
direction of the effect of diversification on the corresponding spread-component are 
therefore unambiguous if the coefficients on DIV and on squared DIV both carry the 
same sign or if only one of the two coefficients is statistically significant. This condition 
is fulfilled in most models but not in the case of the net interest margin and in the case 
of the cost of equity. Note that the models in Table 5 control for a general trend towards 
more non-interest revenue via the variable non-interest income over interest income. 
All three non-interest income margins appear to be positive and linear functions of di-
versification, indicating that banks benefit from revenue economies of scope (see col-
umns (2)–(5)). Expenses per asset dollar are also increasing in the degree of diversifica-
tion (see column (6)), indicating that banks do not benefit from cost economies of 
scope. However, this result does not hold anymore if one uses the cost-income ratio to 
measure cost efficiency. Column (7) shows that more diversified banks incur lower ex-
penses per dollar in total revenues. A possible explanation for the discrepancy in both 
measures is that leverage declines as a consequence of higher diversification (see col-
umn (8)). So perhaps expenses over assets increase primarily because diversified banks 
operate with less assets per dollar in equity and also with less assets per dollar in operat-
ing expenses. 
Loan loss provisions are only very weakly affected by diversification. The model in 
column (9) of Table 5 predicts that expected loan losses are slightly higher for diversi-
                                                 
7 While not shown here we also estimated extended models that feature interaction terms of DIV with the variables 
for vertical integration and growth. The statistical and economic relevance of diversification effects remained 
unchanged. 
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fied banks than for focused banks. This result does not change if we use total revenues 
instead of total assets as the denominator of the dependent variable. 
Column (10) shows that diversification is associated with smaller current equity growth. 
In the last section we reported that there is no systematic relationship between current 
equity growth and market valuation. We can therefore largely rule out that diversifica-
tion reduces market valuations through a deterioration of growth rates. 
The estimated effects of diversification on net interest margins and on the cost of equity 
are not monotonous across the support of DIV. They can be best analyzed by means of 
numerical examples. The same is true for the aggregate effect of diversification on 
spread-components. The next section presents numerical examples for the median bank 
in the sample and three specific bank types. 
5.3. Numerical Examples 
Column 2 in Table 6 reports sample median values for the eight spread-components. We 
define the median bank from our sample as a bank for which spread-components take 
on the values shown in column 1. Column 3 reports the estimated change for each of the 
spread-components if the median bank augments diversification by 10 percentage points 
(roughly two thirds of the sample standard deviation for DIV). Estimated changes in 
single spread-components are computed based on the corresponding coefficients on 
DIV and squared DIV in Table 5.8 Aggregate changes on spread are computed based on 
estimated individual changes in conjunction with equation (8). To verify results on ag-
gregate spread effects we also computed diversification effects on SPREAD based on 
the coefficients from the regression shown in column (1) of Table 5. 
 
Our model predicts that if the median bank had increased its diversification level from 
32% to 42%, its total revenue margin would ceteris paribus have increased by 62 basis 
                                                 
8 We used both significant and insignificant coefficients. To check whether the results in Table 6 are driven by this 
procedure we dropped all insignificant variables from the models in Table 5, re-estimated the reduced models 
and used only significant coefficients for the numerical examples. Estimated effects on spread remained largely 
unchanged. 
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points. The slight 10 basis point drop in net interest margin would have been overcom-
pensated by a combined 72 basis point increase in fee, trading and other income mar-
gins. 
The model also predicts that total operating expenses over assets would have gone up by 
22 basis points and that loan loss provisions over assets would have added another 2 ba-
sis points to total expenses over assets. Both leverage and cost of equity are estimated to 
decline slightly as a result of more diversification. 
These effects are commensurate with the existence of non-trivial revenue and cost 
economies of scope in banking. As banks extend their business scope, they might find it 
easier to (cross-) sell more products to the same customers. In some cases non-interest 
business can, however, slightly cannibalize a bank’s conventional interest-related busi-
ness, as indicated by the negative diversification effect on the interest margin. 
When measured over total revenues, expenses decline in response to diversification (see 
last row in Table 6). This implies that diversified banks need ceteris paribus fewer in-
puts to generate the same revenue volume as focused banks. Possible reasons for this re-
sult are that revenue diversification permits banks to use some of their resources (e.g., 
branches, IT systems, brands) more productively. 
Table 6 also shows that diversification effects on current spread are quite sizable. Our 
model for the median bank predicts that individual diversification effects on spread-
components add up to a total effect of 4.0%. This estimate is comparable to the 3.2% 
increase in spread that is implied by the model in column (1) of Table 5. We conclude 
that diversification has increased value creation in banking over the past years. 
If current spread is a positive function of diversification and if market-to-book is a posi-
tive function of current spread, then market-to-book should be a positive function of di-
versification. If spread increased by four percentage points (e.g., induced by diversifica-
tion), the model in Table 4 predicts that market-to-book would grow by 22 basis points. 
Hypothetically, the median bank could have increased its market-to-book ratio from 
1.73 to 1.95 through a 10 percentage point push in diversification. 
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To see whether our results also hold for specific bank types other than the median bank 
we selected retail banks, investment banks and universal banks from our sample, com-
puted the group medians for the variables and then estimated diversification on spread-
components and spread (refer to Table 8 for selection criteria). Table 6 documents that 
economies of scope seem to exist for all three bank types and that diversification effects 
are somewhat stronger for universal banks and somewhat weaker for retail banks than 
for the median bank. Moreover, Table 6 suggests that aggregate diversification effects 
are extremely powerful for investment banks. The fact that the corresponding estimate 
from the model in column (1) of Table 5 is much lower than the aggregate figure indi-
cates that our models and the way we aggregate individual effects into an aggregate ef-
fect are less accurate for very high diversification levels. 
 
6. Further Evidence 
6.1. Robustness Tests 
Our main result is that increased revenue bank diversification increases the market value 
of banks through a positive effect on current profitability. This result rests on the as-
sumption that diversification affects profitability, but not the other way around. Since 
our diversification measure is based on revenues, the two variables can be endogenous. 
To control for a potential endogeneity bias, we provide two robustness tests. First, we 
estimate the impact of diversification on the spread, using lagged values of our diversi-
fication measure. Second, we apply two-stage least squares (2SLS) and use lagged di-
versification as the instrument for current diversification.9  
As can be seen from Table 7, the coefficient on the lagged diversification variable (and 
the instrumented counterpart) is positive and statistically significant. This confirms our 
result that an increase in diversification increases bank profitability, even when taking 
potential endogeneity into account.10
                                                 
9 We do not need to include additional risk measures in the regression model because spread is defined as ROE minus 
cost of capital, which is based on the estimate of the bank’s systematic risk (beta). 
10 Note that including the squared diversification measure does not affect the result. 
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6.2. Extended Sample 
The preceding analysis is based on a sample of large, exchange-listed banks. This per-
mitted us to analyze the effect on market valuations. In a separate analysis, we used an 
extended sample that contains a total of 4,014 bank-year observations from both listed 
and non-listed banks from the same nine countries. While not shown here, the results for 
the nine models from Table 5 that we could estimate without market data remained 
qualitatively the same.11
6.3. Long-Term Operating Performance 
Further evidence for the existence of a positive relationship between diversification and 
operating bank performance is provided by Holzhäuser 2005. He analyzes how large 
changes in diversification levels affect subsequent long-term operating performance of 
US bank holding companies. With a sample of 621 banks covering the years 1990 to 
2004 he measures revenue diversification according to equation (10). He finds that in-
dustry-adjusted operating return increases on average by 2.2% over the three years fol-
lowing a major increase in diversification.  
Conclusions 
                                                                                                                                               
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11 Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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This paper is motivated by the observation that over the last decade and all around the 
world, many banks have become more diversified while many non-financial firms have 
become more focused with regard to the spectrum of their business activities. If the di-
versification trend in banking is not just a sign of agency conflicts between weak bank 
shareholders and empire-building managers, then it must be rooted in structural differ-
ences between banking and non-financial industries. We hypothesized that it is either 
the banking firm and in particular the characteristics of its production function that is 
special or it is the current state of the banking industry and in particular its high degree 
of strategic uncertainty that has been very special.  
Our empirical results signify that positive diversification effects have outweighed diver-
sification cost in banking and thus largely rule out that bank diversification has solely 
been a consequence of severe agency conflicts. Moreover, the paper provides evidence 
through its comprehensive multi-tier empirical framework that diversification benefits 
are embedded in the production function of most banking firms. Our results suggest that 
economies of scope (at least among related activities) are stronger in banking than in 
many other industries. We find no evidence in favor of the hypothesis that banks have 
diversified primarily in an effort to deal with the strategic uncertainty in their industry 
(foot-in-the-door strategy), as suggested by Boot 2003. Capital markets have been indif-
ferent with regard to any diversification costs or benefits that go beyond direct effects 
on current operating performance. 
Given that diversification benefits are tied more to the way financial services are pro-
duced and less so to the particular challenges the banking industry has been facing over 
the last decade, it seems likely that banks will also benefit from diversification in the fu-
ture. And given the fact that a majority of banks still operate at medium levels of diver-
sification, we assume that the industry wide trend towards revenue diversification will 
continue over the next years. 
Finally, on a methodological note, our paper suggests that simple measures of diversifi-
cation like non-interest revenue over total revenue might in fact be overly simplistic to 
capture all diversification effects. The same is probably true for econometric models 
that focus on the direct diversification effects on market valuations. Our paper shows 
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that diversification effects do not typically materialize through such direct effects but 
rather through indirect effects on current operating performance and is thereby able to 
reveal a conglomeration premium in banking. 
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Figure 1: Revenue Composition and Diversification by Year 
The figure shows the mean proportions of the different revenue streams as a percentage 
of operating revenues. Operating revenue is the sum of the four revenue streams. In ad-
dition the graph presents the development of the mean diversification. In total there are 
380 banks included in the calculation. 
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Table 1: Description of Variables 
Diversification See equation (10) 
Return on equity (Net revenues – operating expenses – loan loss provi-
sions)*effective tax rate / (0.5*beginning-of-period book equity 
+ 0.5*end-of-period book equity) 
Spread Return on equity – cost of equity 
Cost of equity 0.05+0.05*Beta 
Market-to-book Market capitalization on Dec 31st/end-of-year book equity 
Beta Calculated based on 250 days of data on return indices for bank 
and for MSCI World market index (data from DataStream).   
Vertical integration (Staff expenses + interest expenses + loan loss provisions) / 
(gross operating revenues – pretax operating income) 
Equity growth  (end-of-period book equity / beginning-of-period book equity) – 
1  
M&A growth (Aggregate deal value from acquisitions and divestitures per 
bank) / (beginning-of-period book equity) – 1 
Organic growth (1 + equity growth) / (1 + M&A growth) – 1 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Bank Structure
Diversification 1917 32.7% 14.1% 0.0% 70.6%
Vertical integration 1917 77.7% 9.4% 36.4% 110.7%
Total Assets (in USDbn) 1917 61.6 145.3 0.1 1264.0
Growth
Growth due to M&A buys 1917 3.8% 11.9% 0.0% 93.1%
Organic Growth 1917 14.4% 27.4% -97.1% 263.6%
Shareholder value
ROE 1917 17.5% 10.0% -35.8% 56.1%
Spread 1917 3.8% 6.7% -34.6% 23.0%
Market-to-book 1917 1.995 1.439 0.075 11.351
Revenue composition
Interest income 1917 62.7% 21.8% -76.9% 102.8%
Fee income 1917 15.2% 15.5% -4.0% 91.1%
Trading income 1917 3.9% 9.6% -15.9% 133.3%
Other operating income 1917 18.2% 19.3% -3.4% 193.0%
Operations
Cost/income 1917 62.8% 14.5% 19.6% 153.4%
Expenses/assets 1917 3.3% 2.6% 0.2% 23.4%
Non-interest income/interest income (gross) 1917 65.1% 230.5% -1.1% 2709.3%
Loan loss provisions/assets 1917 0.00031% 0.00040% -0.00028% 0.00314%
Risk
Assets/equity 1917 13.438 6.176 1.502 62.106
Beta 1917 0.644 0.475 -0.634 1.964  
 
 
Table 3: Development of Diversification 
Summary statistic of the development of the diversification measure in the US com-
pared to Europe from 1996–2003. 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
USA 29.8% 30.3% 31.7% 31.3% 27.5% 30.3% 34.3% 38.3%
Europe 28.2% 28.8% 31.9% 34.6% 34.8% 33.3% 33.7% 37.2%
Total sample 29.3% 29.9% 31.8% 32.5% 29.6% 31.2% 34.3% 38.0%  
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The table reports the results for a fixed-effects model with market-to-book (MTB) as 
dependent variable. *,**,*** denote significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respec-
tively. The full model includes year dummies (not shown here). 
Table 4: Market-to-Book Ratio 
p-value
Diversification -0.825 0.311
(Diversification)^2 1.008 0.417
Vertical Integration -4.551 0.128
(Vertical Integration )^2 2.551 0.171
Spread 5.813 *** 0.000
Growth due to M&A buys -0.224 0.218
Organic Growth 0.085 0.277
Log(assets) -1.474 *** 0.000
Non-interest income/interest income (gross) -0.117 *** 0.000
Constant 17.668 *** 0.000
 
N 1917  
Groups 380  
R²  
F-Test
0.3179
44.31 *** 0.000
coefficient
Market-to-book ratio
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Table 5: Spread and Spread-Components 
The table reports the results from fixed effects regression models. Dependent variables are in column headers. *,**,*** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively. The full models include year dummies (not shown here). 
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Diversification 0.099 ** 0.023 -0.056 *** 0.000 0.015 ** 0.010 0.006 * 0.054 0.029 *** 0.000
(Diversification)^2 0.297 *** 0.000 0.062 *** 0.000 0.013 0.124 0.022 *** 0.000 -0.004 0.647
Vertical Integration 1.085 *** 0.000 0.037 *** 0.002 -0.028 0.177 0.020 * 0.076 -0.139 *** 0.000
(Vertical Integration )^2 -0.434 *** 0.000 -0.029 *** 0.000 0.011 0.409 -0.008 0.273 0.081 *** 0.000
Spread
Growth due to M&A buys -0.037 *** 0.000 -0.002 *** 0.009 0.000 0.900 0.000 0.998 0.001 0.613
Organic Growth -0.004 0.349 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 * 0.097 0.001 * 0.064 0.000 0.460
Log(assets) -0.011 ** 0.040 -0.002 *** 0.000 -0.004 *** 0.000 -0.001 ** 0.014 -0.004 *** 0.000
Non-interest income/interest income (gross) 0.006 *** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.001 *** 0.000 0.001 *** 0.000 0.004 *** 0.000
Beta 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.531 0.000 0.205 0.000 0.456
Constant -0.486 *** 0.000 0.055 *** 0.000 0.056 *** 0.000 -0.003 0.644 0.099 *** 0.000
     
N 1917  1917  1917  1917  1917  
Groups 380  380  380  380  380  
R² 0.2456  0.3462  0.1309  0.1272  0.3086  
F-Test 30.95 *** 0.000 47.34 *** 0.000 13.47 *** 0.000 13.03 *** 0.000 39.91 *** 0.000
Net interest 
income/assets (2)
coefficient coefficient
Spread (1) Fee income/assets (3)
coefficient
Trading 
income/assets (4)
Other income/assets 
(5)
coefficient coefficient
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Table 5: Spread and Spread-Components (cont.) 
The table reports the results from fixed effects regression models. Dependent variables are in column headers. *,**,*** denote significance 
at the 10%, 5% and 1%-level, respectively. The full models include year dummies (not shown here). 
p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value p-value
Diversification -0.010 0.137 -0.152 ** 0.021 -0.839 0.686 -0.002 0.235 0.022 * 0.090 -2.774 *** 0.003
(Diversification)^2 0.044 *** 0.000 -0.123 0.219 -5.965 * 0.059 0.006 * 0.075 -0.059 *** 0.003 0.212 0.663
Vertical Integration -0.261 *** 0.000 -2.618 *** 0.000 -9.598 0.201 -0.005 0.551 -0.015 0.746 -1.723 0.160
(Vertical Integration )^2 0.127 *** 0.000 1.237 *** 0.000 9.214 * 0.052 0.008 * 0.090 0.012 0.673 0.305 0.649
Spread
Growth due to M&A buys 0.004 *** 0.005 0.080 *** 0.000 -1.833 *** 0.000 0.000 0.486 -0.004 0.158
Organic Growth 0.000 0.496 0.016 ** 0.012 -1.574 *** 0.000 0.000 0.178 -0.003 ** 0.021
Log(assets) -0.011 *** 0.000 -0.019 ** 0.016 1.516 *** 0.000 0.000 0.759 0.008 *** 0.000 0.327 *** 0.000
Non-interest income/interest income (gross) 0.001 *** 0.000 -0.010 *** 0.000 -0.239 *** 0.002 0.000 0.216 0.000 0.763 0.010 0.324
Beta 0.000 0.918 0.006 0.330 0.101 0.623 0.000 0.977 -0.074 *** 0.006
Constant 0.259 *** 0.000 2.045 *** 0.000 3.459 0.349 0.000 0.951 0.016 0.477 -1.056 * 0.097
      
N 1917  1917  1917  1917  1917  1917  
Groups 380  380  380  380  380  380  
R² 0.3379  0.2269  0.1337  0.0911  0.1215  0.1268  
F-Test 45.64 *** 0.000 26.24 *** 0.000 14.67 *** 0.000 8.96 *** 0.000 13.15 *** 0.000 13.8 *** 0
Expenses/assets (6) Equity growth (11)
coefficient
Loan loss 
provisions/assets (9)Assets/equity (8)
coefficient coefficientcoefficient coefficient
Cost of equity (10)
coefficient
Cost/income ratio (7)
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The table reports the estimated change in spread-components, spread and market-to-book ratio if diversification level is increased by 10 
percentage points. Changes for spread-components are calculated based on the corresponding coefficients in Table 5 and median values per 
bank type. The aggregate effect on spread is computed based on estimated changes in the spread-components and based on equation (8). 
The estimated effect on spread is computed based on the coefficients in column (1) of Table 5. The effect on market-to-book is computed 
by entering the aggregate effect on spread in the model from Table 4. Bank type definitions are reported in Table 8. 
Median value
Hypothetical 
change in ppt Median value
Hypothetical 
change in ppt Median value
Hypothetical 
change in ppt Median value
Hypotheti
change in ppt
Diversification 32.07% 10.00% 24.29% 10.00% 53.16% 10.00% 39.89% 10.00%
Expenses/assets 2.75% 0.22% 2.58% 0.16% 2.81% 0.41% 3.28% 0.29%
LLP/assets 0.22% 0.02% 0.19% 0.01% 0.04% 0.04% 0.28% 0.03%
Assets/equity 11.97 -0.53 11.53 -0.43 20.47 -0.78 11.43 -0.62
Net interest income/assets 3.00% -0.10% 3.42% -0.20% 0.78% 0.16% 3.09% -0.01%
Fee income/assets 0.45% 0.24% 0.35% 0.22% 0.69% 0.30% 0.59% 0.27%
Trading income/assets 0.04% 0.22% 0.02% 0.19% 0.70% 0.31% 0.06% 0.26%
Other operating income/assets 0.59% 0.26% 0.49% 0.26% 1.68% 0.24% 1.29% 0.25%
Cost of Equity 7.91% -0.22% 7.15% -0.13% 12.25% -0.47% 8.49% -0.31%
A
cal 
ggregate Effect on Spread 5.3% 4.0% 10.2% 3.0% 8.2% 10.7% 8.4% 4.2%
Estimated Effect on Spread 4.3% 3.2% 4.8% 2.7% 2.7% 4.4% 4.9% 3.6%
Price-to-book-ratio (indirect) 1.73 0.22 1.75 0.15 1.95 0.66 1.83 0.25
Memo item:
Cost/income ratio 62.06% -2.43% 59.55% -2.24% 72.01% -2.95% 63.21% -2.63%
Median Bank Retail Bank Investment Bank Universal Bank
 
Table 6: Hypothetical Changes in Operating Performance Given an Increase in Diversification
The Anatom
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Table 7: Robustness Regressions 
The table shows regression results for various robustness tests of our results in Table 4. 
For a definition of the variables, see Table 1. Estimator denotes the applied estimation 
technique, where FE is fixed effects and 2SLS is two-stage least squares. The first row 
denotes the dependent variable. *, **, *** denote significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10%-
level, respectively.  
Coefficient p-value Coefficient p-value
Diversification --- ---
Diversification (Lag 1 / Instrumented) 0.161 *** 0.000 0.405 *** 0.000
Non-interest income/interest income (gross) 0.002 0.287 0.008*** 0.000
Growth due to M&A buys -0.031 *** 0.007 -0.029 *** 0.009
Organic Growth -0.003 0.948 -0.005 0.253
Vertical Integration 1.056 *** 0.000 0.913 *** 0.000
(Vertical Integration )^2 -0.455 ** 0.000 -0.303 *** 0.006
log(assets) -0.023 *** 0.000 -0.022 *** 0.000
Estimator
N
Adj. R2
1595
0.2 0.25
1595
Spread Spread
Panel FE with Year Panel FE, 2SLS
 
 
Table 8: Categorization of Banks 
This table reports the criteria for categorizing sample banks.  
Investment bank Universal bank Retail bank
Deposits/assets <40% >60% >70%
Loans/assets >50%
Gross interest income/assets <75% <80% >80%*
* Additionally: Trading income/operating income <5%  
 
